Authentication is the basis of the security of IEEE 802.11i standard. The authentication process in 802.11i involves two important protocols： a 4-way handshake and a group key handshake. A formal analysis of authentication in 802.11i is given via a belief multisets formalism. The analysis shows that the 4-way handshake and the group key handshake may provide satisfactory mutual authentication, key management, and issue of a new group temporal key from an access point to a user device, under the guarantee of mutual possession of a confidential palrwise master key. The analysis also shows that there exists a denial of service attack in the 4-way handshake and some seeming redundancies are useful in the protocol implementation.
Recently some efforts were made towards capturing the security requirements within the composable security framework. This modeling has some significant advantages in designing and analyzing complex systems. The threshold signature was discussed and a definition was given based on the universal composability framework, which is proved to be equivalent to the standard security definition. Furthermore, a simple, efficient and proactive threshold RSA signature protocol was presented. It is proved to be correct, consistent and unforgeable relative to the environment that at most t - 1 parties are corrupted in each proactive stage. It is also secure under the universal composability framework. It is a UC based security and is proved to be equivalent to the standard security.
In proxy signature schemes, an original signer A delegates its signing capability to a proxy signer B, in such a way that B can sign message on behalf of A.The recipient of the final message verifies at the same time that B computes the signature and that A has delegated its signing capability to B.Recently many identity-based(ID-based) proxy signature schemes have been proposed, however, the problem of key escrow is inherent in this setting.Certificateless cryptography can overcome the key escrow problem.In this paper, we present a general security model for certificateless proxy signature scheme.Then, we give a method to construct a secure certificateless proxy scheme from a secure certificateless signature scheme, and prove that the security of the construction can be reduced to the security of the original certificateless signature scheme.
