在Stackelberg竞争框架下,本文沿用Spencer and Brander(1983)第三国市场模型,考虑存在中间品贸易情形时,一国的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,在只有单个国家可以实施研发政策的情况下,若最终产品间的差异程度较大(小),那么该国的最优研发政策为征税(补贴);而当两国政府均可以干预各自国内企业研发时,一国最优的研发政策将随最终产品间的差异程度不同而选择征税、补贴或不干预,并且当最终产品间的差异程度位于一定范围之内时,一国的研发补贴政策并不会招致另一国的报复,因此,战略性研发补贴政策并不如Leahyand Neary(2001)分析的稳健。
Employing Grossman and Helpman＇s ＂protection for sale＂ model, this article uses data on anti-dumping actions from 1999 to 2009 to perform a quantitative analysis of factors influencing India＇s determinations of anti-dumping duties against China, and reveals the micro-formation mechanism of economic conflicts between China and India. We find that the political power of India＇s anti-dumping plaintiffs markedly increases the tariff level of its final determinations and that the relationship between the import penetration ratio and duty rates depends upon whether the plaintiffs are politically organized. Further, there is a significant positive correlation between India＇s anti-dumping duty rates and its unfavorable trade balance with China. This indicates that in determining anti-dumping duties, Indian authorities are clearly influenced by the political clout of their domestic interest groups. They are also motivated by the desire to keep down China and gain the upper hand in the face-off between the ＂dragon and the elephant.＂
