近年来,网络视频产业迅猛发展,长视频平台通过获取独家版权来构建版权壁垒,这不仅限制了市场竞争,也阻碍了短视频平台的成长。此外,长视频平台的版权滥用行为对市场竞争和消费者权益造成了损害。如限制内容获取、提高转授权费用、拒绝交易等。为解决这些问题,可以采取推动版权授权模式创新、确立竞争损害标准作为反垄断法介入的标准、强化持续性监管措施等具体路径。通过实施这些策略,我们期望能够规范网络视频行业的市场竞争秩序,并且助力短视频这一新业态的发展。In recent years, the online video industry has experienced rapid growth. Long-form video platforms have built copyright barriers by purchasing exclusive rights, which has restricted market competition and the development of short-form video platforms. The abuse of copyright by long-form video platforms has harmed market competition and consumer rights, such as limiting content access, increasing licensing fees, and refusing to trade. To address these issues, specific approaches can be adopted, including promoting innovation in copyright licensing models, establishing competition damage standards as criteria for antitrust law intervention, and strengthening continuous regulatory measures. By implementing these strategies, we hope to regulate the market competition order in the online video industry and support the development of the short-form video industry as a new business model.
近年来电商直播领域存在的“全网最低价”条款属于典型的代理模式下的平台最惠国条款。其存在市场封锁、共谋、损害消费者福利等限制竞争效果,需要通过反垄断法予以规制,但也具有降低交易成本等促进竞争效果,不宜一概禁止。垄断协议和滥用市场支配地位制度都是规制电商直播平台最惠国条款(PMFN条款)的必需手段。通过这两种制度规制电商直播平台最惠国条款(PMFN条款)时分别面临代理人独立性判断、市场支配地位认定的困境。在垄断协议规制方面,可以结合电商直播行业特点,以市场影响力、责任承担作为独立性的认定标准。在滥用市场支配地位规制方面,可以引入共同市场支配地位、丰富认定市场支配地位的考虑因素帮助认定市场支配地位。In recent years, the “lowest price on the net” clause in the field of e-commerce live streaming belongs to the typical platform most-favored-nation clause (PMFN clause) under the agency model. It has the effect of restricting competition such as market blockade, conspiracy, and harming consumer welfare, which needs to be regulated through the antitrust law, but also has the effect of promoting competition such as reducing transaction costs, which is not suitable to be prohibited altogether. Monopoly agreements and abuse of the dominant market position are both necessary means to regulate the PMFN clause. Regulating the PMFN clause through these two regimes, it faces the dilemmas of judging the independence of agents and determining the dominant market position respectively. The regulation of monopoly agreements, can be combined with the characteristics of the e-commerce live broadcast industry, market influence, liability as the determination of independence standards. As for the regulation of abuse of dominant market position, common dominant market position can be introduced, and the considerations for determining dominant market position can be enriched to he
数字经济平台在逐利性本能的趋势下,为了获得更大的经济效益,通过歧视性排序、恶意分析第三方经营数据等方式优待下游市场的经营业务。将竞争优势进行跨市场的传导。从本质上分析,竞争优势的跨市场传导在一定程度上构成了对市场优势地位的滥用,应当通过反垄断法来进行规制。但是由于目前判断数字平台缺乏自我优待行为违法性认定的标准、市场支配地位难以认定、正当理由的抗辩理由不合理滥用模糊了自我优待行为的反垄断法规制的边界。故本文提出需要明确平台自我优待行为违法性判定的独立框架与要件、完善数字平台相关市场界定、规范自我优待行为的合理限度等角度以期明确平台自治的合理限度,为数字平台经济的未来的发展提供坚实有力的保障。Under the trend of profit-seeking instinct, digital economy platforms give preferential treatment to the business of downstream markets through discriminatory sorting and malicious analysis of third-party business data in order to obtain greater economic benefits. Transmit competitive advantage across markets. In essence, the cross-market transmission of competitive advantage constitutes an abuse of market dominance to a certain extent, and should be included in the scope of anti-monopoly laws and regulations. However, due to the lack of standards for determining the illegality of self-preferential treatment on digital platforms, the difficulty in determining market dominance, and the unreasonable abuse of justifiable defenses, the boundaries of anti-monopoly laws and regulations for self-preferential treatment have blurred. Therefore, this paper proposes that it is necessary to clarify the independent framework and requirements for determining the illegality of platform self-preferential behavior, improve the definition of the relevant market of digital platforms, and standardize the reasonable limits of self-preferential behavior, so as to c
电子商务平台是互联网经济背景下组织生产力的一种常见方式,是数字经济形态的线上市场,承担着管理电商卖家,充当买卖纠纷仲裁者的角色。与传统经济隐形垄断相比,电商平台“二选一”强制性更为突出,也更大程度上排除了潜在的平台竞争者。当前,在对电商平台“二选一”行为的法律规制存在一定缺陷的情况下,对于该行为法律规制路径完善,可从立法、执法和司法三个层面开展。The e-commerce platform represents a common approach to organizing productivity against the backdrop of the Internet economy. It serves as an online marketplace within the digital economy, tasked with managing e-commerce sellers and acting as an arbitrator in disputes between buyers and sellers. Compared to the covert monopolies of the traditional economy, the “choose one from two” practice imposed by e-commerce platforms is more pronounced and excludes potential platform competitors to a greater extent. Currently, given the existing deficiencies in legal regulations concerning e-commerce platforms’ “choose one from-two” behavior, efforts to improve the legal regulatory pathway for such behavior can be approached from three levels: legislation, law enforcement, and judicature.
“二选一”是指电商平台利用其优势地位,要求平台上的经营者不得在其他平台上经营的行为。“二选一”一定程度上侵害了其他电商平台和平台上经营者的合法权益,也损害了广大消费者的公平选择权和自主交易权,有必要予以规制。当前,我国法律在规制“二选一”行为时均展现出一定的局限性,导致不能有效规制“二选一”行为。因此,应采取有效措施解决这一问题,具体而言,应将《反垄断法》作为规制“二选一”行为的核心规范,并对其进行完善,如明确正当理由的认定标准,引入滥用相对优势地位条款,完善平台监管体系。“Either-Or Choice” refers to the behaviour of an e-commerce platform that takes advantage of its dominant position to require operators on the platform not to operate on other platforms. To a certain extent, “Either-Or Choice” infringes on the legitimate rights and interests of other e-commerce platforms and operators on the platform, and also damages the consumers’ right to fair choice and right to independent transactions, and it is necessary to regulate it. At present, China’s laws show certain limitations in regulating the “Either-Or Choice” behaviour, resulting in the failure to effectively regulate the “Either-Or Choice” behaviour. Therefore, effective measures should be taken to solve this problem. Specifically, the Anti-Monopoly Law should be taken as the core norms to regulate the “Either-Or Choice” behaviour and be improved, such as clarifying the criteria for the determination of justifiable reasons, introducing the clause of abuse of comparative advantage, and perfecting the platform supervision system.
